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Evaluate the Effect of IMF’s Longer-Term Concessional Lending Programs
on Growth in the Development Background of Sub-Saharan Region
Abstract
Despite different voices from critics, the IMF has put development at the center of its policies. This paper tries
to separate the effect of SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and ECF on growth empirically. Selecting a sample of 44 countries
in the Sub-Saharan region from 1986 to 2011, it analyzes whether the IMF’s longer-term structural
adjustment programs influences economic growth in participating countries. Consistent with previous
studies, this research shows that SAF and ESAF have statistically insignificant impact on growth in the short
term and long term. PRGF and ECF, on the other hand, are found to have a large and strong positive
correlation with growth rate in the short run, and immaterial impact in the long run. Results also show that
the structural adjustment programs not only offer impact through loan disbursement, but more through the
catalytic effect that goes along with the loan. The overall result provides evidence that the “streamlining”
revolution of the IMF in providing structural adjustment advice has shown optimistic effect in Sub-Saharan
Africa economic growth.
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I. Introduction 
Founded at the end of the World War II, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has played a key role in shaping the global economy. Standing at the center of the world 
economic development, the IMF has seen much criticism towards its structure and 
lending practices over the past 70 years. In 1986, accompanying the crisis in the third 
world countries and the emerging structural problems from the countries in transition, the 
IMF started its first formal longer term structural adjustment assistance program to low 
income countries, the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). From 1986 to present, the 
IMF’s longer term structural adjustment programs have been evolving and expanding, 
and its effectiveness has been the focus of criticism. Although under pressure from 
numerous independent studies urging it to abandon its role in development, the IMF has 
regarded growth and development the ultimate goal of all its modern programs.  
Since its liberation, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the longest period of 
economic growth only recently. In spite of this, Mbadlanyana, Sibalukhulu and Cilliers 
(2011) predict that most issues relating to severe global poverty will be located in this 
region in the next few decades. The issues of African development are long-term. 
Starting with the region’s independence, its development has accumulated attention from 
most bilateral and multilateral aid agencies; however, a series of traps has prevented the 
growth and aid effectiveness in this region. Most of the Sub-Saharan African countries 
have joined the IMF membership since the early 1970s, and one of the first groups of 
countries borrowing from the structural adjustment programs is from the Sub-Saharan 
region. Since 1986, it has been the center location of structural adjustment aid from the 
IMF. By 1999, as Hutchison and Noy (2003) calculated, Africa had accumulated 72% of 
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all the long-term programs from the IMF since 1952. Notwithstanding, little systematic 
attention has been paid to assessing the impact of aid on government actions and the 
results in this region (Mbadlanyana, Sibalukhulu, and Cilliers, 2011).   
There are a tremendous number of studies evaluating the IMF’s program and 
policy effectiveness. Nevertheless, most of these studies have either been focusing on the 
short-term balance-of-payment-centered facilities, or have not been specifying any types 
of programs at all. Given the different nature of the longer term structural adjustment 
programs, therefore, a systematic study is in need. Even in the limited literature on IMF 
structural adjustment programs, the latest I have encountered was a review study 
published in 2006. Since then, there has been another cycle of changes in IMF’s 
structural adjustment programs, which the PRGF had been implemented for ten years and 
was succeeded by a new program ECF in 2009. In order to capture the evolution of the 
structural adjustment programs in the 2000s, in this paper, I included a time span from 
1986 to 2011, the full history of the structural adjustment programs. I selected the Sub-
Saharan African countries as the development context in evaluating the effectiveness of 
the IMF’s longer-term structural adjustment programs, including the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). 
With a full life-span of ten years of data on the PRGF implementation as well as the new 
start of ECF, this paper will provide a more comprehensive scope. While focusing on one 
specific region, the region with the most usage of structural programs, I effectively 
eliminate the geopolitical heterogeneity that might potentially bias the result.   
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In this research, I referred to the political economics model from Ivanova et 
al.(2001) to construct a theoretical hypothesis of the relationship between the IMF and 
the incumbent government. In the model, the aid and conditionality effectiveness to the 
country’s welfare depends on government’s level of concern to the general public and the 
bargaining process between the IMF and the government. The higher the IMF’s plan 
weights in the bargaining, the more the government is concerned about its people, and 
hence, the higher welfare a program brings to.  
 Based on this model, I ran a series of probit regressions to evaluate the 
determinants of participating in an IMF structural adjustment program and tobit 
regressions to evaluate the determinants of loan disbursement from each individual 
structural adjustment program. At last, a set of fixed effect regressions with robust 
country group clustered error adjustment were employed to assess the effect of 
participation and loan disbursement of the structural adjustment program on growth rate 
in Sub-Saharan countries. I not only looked at the immediate effect from the aid 
disbursement, but also the effect afterwards until three years later. According to the 
result, the level of loan disbursement from SAF had a negative effect on growth across 
years. As the evolution of the IMF’s longer term structural adjustment program, the more 
and more positive results are seen in its effect on growth. The ECF, the most recently 
modified and adopted program has demonstrated a large and strong statistically 
significant positive effect on growth; however, due to data availability, the robustness is 
still in need of verification.  
Due to data availability, some more extensive econometric skills are not able to 
fully account for certain issues. Fixed effect method can only account for the unobserved 
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factors that maybe correlated to growth and program participation, and only under the 
situation of unobserved factors being stable over the years. Instrumental variable is still 
needed to account for the direct relationship between growth and program participation. 
The effect of the World Bank is deemed to be significant in the Sub-Saharan region, 
especially towards growth and poverty reduction. However, this paper could not find 
enough supporting data to control the effect of the World Bank on this region’s growth. 
The measurement of the loan disbursement may also bias the effect in the short run.  
The rest of this paper continues as follows: Section II provides history and theory 
backgrounds for the IMF and its programs, the history of IMF structural adjustment 
programs, and the Sub-Saharan development.  Section III presents a literature review on 
key findings and arguments in previous studies on the effectiveness of IMF programs and 
on growth and poverty reduction theories. Section IV provides theoretical framework and 
hypotheses for this paper, and introduces variables for the analysis. Section V explains 
research methodology. Section VI gives data and descriptive analysis. Section VII 
presents regression analysis. Section VIII discusses the key results from the regression; 
and lastly, Section VIIII concludes the study by summarizing its findings and 
contributions and its policy implementation.   
 
II. Background 
A. Brief History of IMF 
Founded in December, 1945, with its membership growing from 29 states to 188 
at present, the IMF has gone through multiple stages of changes. As an almost universal 
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financial institution (Barro and Lee, 2005), its history has been shaped by and is shaping 
the world’s historical events, as well as the evolution of economic ideas (Bird, 2007). In 
its role in providing regular consultation to all member countries, collecting data and 
overseeing the world economy, lending resources and advising on policies to bring about 
economic adjustment, the IMF has been on the focus of close attention and critical 
examination (Bird, 2007).  
When the IMF was officially initiated, its purpose was to oversee the operation of 
the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. Besides this main purpose, the IMF 
was also an adjustment agency providing advice on balance of payment policy, and a 
financing agency providing short-term liquidity to countries encountering balance of 
payment problems (Bird and Mosely, 2003). However, since the early 1970s, as the 
flexible exchange rate regime replaced the fixed ones, the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed; private capital market providing balance of payment financing shifted the 
responsibility of the IMF away (Bird and Mosely, 2003). Accordingly, much of the 
IMF’s systemic role disappeared.   
In 1980s, the Third World debt crisis induced the IMF’s involvement in smaller 
and poorer countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Followed by the fall of 
communism in the 1990s, it created a number of new borrowing countries, so-called 
countries in transition. And indeed, the IMF ceased lending to industrial countries 
altogether (Bird and Mosely, 2003). With its increasing involvement in countries and 
issues that it was not originally designed to handle, the IMF has been exposed to a 
broader range of criticism. The Meltzer Commission, a leading critic, argues that the IMF 
was ineffective and inefficient, and was in need of a reform (Bird, 2007). Conditionality 
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was also perceived as excessive (Bird, 2004). Facing these criticisms, the IMF started a 
reassessment of its programs and is trying to establish a medium-term strategy (IMF, 
2005).  
B. IMF programs and conditionality 
Upon joining the IMF, each member country is required to contribute to 25% of 
the quota in the form of international currency or SDR. The size of the quota depends on 
the size of the member country’s economy. Hence, the 25% of the quota is free for the 
country to take out (Barro and Lee, 2005). If a country, however, needs to withdraw more 
than 25% of the quota, it needs to comply with IMF’s loan conditions (Przeworski and 
Vreeland, 2000).  
The IMF Articles of Agreement entails IMF facilities to provide temporary 
balance-of-payment support to countries. In order to fulfill the requirement of 
“temporary,” the IMF created the policy of conditionality over time to assist participating 
countries to exit quickly from its balance of payment problems (Conway, 2007). The 
typical conditionality involves “fiscal austerity, tight monetary policy, and currency 
devaluation” (Taylor, 1993). The combination of purchase facility and associated 
conditions is referred to as an IMF program. As calculated by Bird (2007), at any one 
time, the IMF may have as many as about 60 active programs with individual countries. 
IMF programs can be categorized into nonconcessional and concessional loans 
based on terms of repayment and interest rate. The typical nonconcessional loans include: 
the Stand-By Agreement (SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and 
Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The concessional loans 
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historically include: Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), and 
currently, the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Standby Credit Facility (SCF), and Rapid 
Credit Facility (RCF). Polak (1991) states that the fundamental objectives of programs 
are similar, and differences only exist in conditions, timing, and size of the loan 
disbursement. In this research, I specifically focus on the longer term structural 
adjustment concessional loans through history, which are SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and 
currently, ECF.  
C. Programs Targeting Growth and Poverty Reduction - History and Importance 
Traditionally, the IMF responds to the balance of payment problems through a 
system of short-term facilities mainly involving SBA and EFF, covering a period of 1-2 
years with repayment between 3 ¼ and 5 years (Barro and Lee, 2005). The notion of 
structural adjustment wasn’t born until after the oil crisis in the late 1970s. Structural 
adjustment entails a combination of macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic 
efficiency and openness (Bird, 2004). Subsequently, in 1986, the IMF established the 
SAF as its first longer term structural adjustment program, to its low income members, 
and the ESAF in 1987, which had a repayment schedule of over 5-10 years after a 5-year 
grace period. In 1999, the ESAF was modified and renamed the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF), which puts economic growth and poverty reduction at the 
center (Barro and Lee, 2005). Later in 2009, IMF approved its modification of PRGF into 
the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), operated under the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Trust (PRGT), which further streamlined its conditionality. As Bird and Mosely (2003) 
explain, these programs impact growth through three channels. The first channel manages 
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the aggregate demand. The second raises aggregate supply through structural adjustment. 
The third relates to catalytic effect that attracts additional private investment and capital 
inflows to the program country.     
D. Sub-Saharan Development 
After a short prosperous boom following its independence in early 1960s, over the 
past 40 years, Africa has stagnated while other developing countries have vastly grown. 
Since 1960, Africa’s share in world trade declined, and per capita GDP in Africa was 
sluggish. This divergence turned Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan area into the world’s 
poorest region. Collier (2006) identifies four development traps for the Sub-Saharan 
region: the conflict trap, the corruption trap, the primary commodity trap and the 
fractionalized society trap. These traps are shown as wide spread coups, civil strife, 
ethnic violence, inefficient use of resource and public administration, decaying 
institutional capacity, deteriorating social conditions, increasing environmental 
degradation and so on (Heidhues, 2009). They prevented Africa’s development and 
weakened the effectiveness of aid. Under these traps, low economic growth ties with low 
investment and saving rates, skyrocketed foreign debt, declining output of industry and 
manufacturing, and adverse terms of trade (Heidhues, 2009). By 1980s, Africa’s crisis 
was deepening. The World Bank and the IMF proposed the structural adjustment 
approach for a fundamental shift to stabilize African economy. Heidhues (2009) 
summarizes that these programs called for reducing the role of state administration in 
macroeconomic policies, containing government spending, privatizing public sectors, and 
most importantly, calling for devaluation and trade liberalization in order to improve 
balance of payment and control for foreign debt. Subsequently, the introduction of the 
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poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) focused more on integrating culture, social, 
environmental and political factors in development strategies, and created a framework 
for pro-poor growth (Heidhues, 2009; Kibuka, 2007).  
While in contrast to the structural programs which were frequently criticized of 
having negative impact on the poor, Bird (2004) concludes that PRGF as a leading PRSP 
from the IMF, has been shown successful effects on reformations in Sub-Saharan region. 
However, PRGF has also been conceived as at cost of increasing unemployment and a 
decline in public services, even in health, education, and research. After a decade of 
endeavor, it is a crucial time to take advantage of the accumulation of data and reevaluate 
the effectiveness of structural adjustment programs on their pro-poor growth target. 
 
III. Literature Review 
A. Arguments on Development Centered Programs 
The shift of focus from stabilization to economic growth and poverty reduction 
has brought up much of the recent argument questioning the role of the IMF. The Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force argues that “IMF should focus on monetary, 
fiscal and exchange rate policies plus financial-sector surveillance and reform and stay 
out of longer-term structural adjustment.” 
The Overseas Development Council (ODC) Task Force also argues that IMF’s 
long-term structural lending has not been effective. The ineffectiveness stems from the 
lending associated moral hazard issues, the overlapping role of IMF’s structural 
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adjustment programs and the World Bank, and the emphasis on mandates and 
conditionality. The Meltzer Report claims that IMF long-term adjustment lending yields 
moral hazard problems through providing an implicit insurance to private creditors, 
which encourages over-lending behavior (Bird and Mosely, 2003). However, Willett 
(1999) and Land and Philips (2000) find no significant evidence on this claim. Instead, 
empirical evidence shows that ESAF with its tight conditionality had a discouraging 
effect on borrowers (Bird, 1995). As to the effectiveness argument, Bird (2004) stated 
that there is hardly a scientific consensus. The most commonly accepted statement 
suggests that IMF programs have at least a short-run negative effect on economic growth 
and possibly enduring adverse effect on growth (Conway, 1994; Killick, 1995; 
Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Hutchison, 2001; Barro and Lee, 2001).  
Despite the numerous arguments advocating a narrow role for the IMF, that the 
IMF should only play as “the lender of the last resort”, Michel Camdessus (1990), the 
previous Managing Director of the IMF stated, “Our primary objective is growth… it is 
with a view toward growth that we carry out our special responsibility of helping to 
correct balance of payments disequilibria and, more generally, to eliminate obstructive 
macroeconomic imbalances.” Stanley Fischer, the previous deputy managing director of 
the IMF regards that macroeconomic stabilization is only a first step to poverty reduction, 
but is not sufficient (in Conway, 2006). 
As previously stated, whether IMF indeed influences economic growth has been 
subject to a huge number of studies; seldom has any strict consensus emerged as whether 
IMF programs positively influenced growth and alleviated poverty. Reasons for this lack 
of agreement on the effectiveness of IMF’s structural adjustment program are 
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multifarious. The first relates to the individual researcher. Different researchers may have 
considered different time periods, or investigated different types of IMF programs 
(Atoyan and Conway, 2005). Evaluation of IMF programs also involves different 
econometric techniques, especially towards the selection issues and endogeneity issues. 
The most common approaches to address the endogeneity problem include before and 
after analysis, control group methodology, fixed effects, and instrumental variables 
(Easterly, 2005). The second reason is the domestic statistical capacity. Most data 
available for research is evidence-based monitoring in program participating countries. 
Constructing statistical monitoring requires financial and human capital support, which is 
the shortcoming in LICs, hence providing constraints on data availability to researchers 
(Kibuka, 2007). Thirdly, the effectiveness of program conditionality also depends on the 
degree of implementation (Arpac, Bird and Mandilaras, 2008).  
B. Growth and Poverty Reduction Theories 
The nature of growth theory is ambiguous. The basic principle of growth relies 
upon factor accumulation and factor productivity. Bird (2004) claims that beyond this 
point, however, theories of growth become complicated. Empirically, Barro (1991) finds 
that growth is positively related to initial human capital and negatively related to the 
initial real per capita GDP. Growth is negatively related to the share of government 
spending in GDP and positively related to political stability and market health. The neo-
classical model states that poor countries are also assumed to growth faster than the rich 
ones, with faster factor accumulations. On the other hand, poor countries can also be at a 
disadvantage due to low life expectancy, which retards incentive to invest in human 
capital (Cohen and Soto, 2002). Other studies, as documented by Collier (2008), show 
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that openness and economic liberalization, health and geography make a significant 
difference to growth. Economic liberalization along with significant institution reform is 
found positively influencing growth. Openness to trade also has a strong positive effect 
on growth. Berg and Krueger (2002) argue that trade and openness contribute to growth 
and thereby alleviate poverty, however Demery (2000) and Rajan and Bird (2002) 
provide evidence that not all groups among the poor benefit from growth in terms of 
openness and trade liberalization. Land-locked countries and those in the tropical zones 
tend to growth slower (Collier, 2008).  
 
IV. Theoretical Framework and Variable Introduction 
A. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses: 
This research selects all longer-term structural adjustment programs from the IMF 
that existed throughout history, evaluating factors leading to the program participation, 
and measures the growth outcome from program participation. Considering each 
programs individually, we can receive conclusion of the program’s effect across years. 
Comparing the growth effect across programs, we can also reach the conclusion of 
whether the evolution of structural adjustment programs in the IMF has been effective. 
Program participation is further measured by whether a country actually participates in a 
program and by the amount of loans disbursed from the program as a proxy to the 
extensiveness of participation.  
In a typical political economy model, we regard the IMF as an international 
financial institution providing support and policy conditionality in affecting the 
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incumbent government’s economic policy choices. The incumbent government decides 
whether to join a program or not. Therefore, it plots a bigger picture once we figure out 
what factors contribute to government’s participation decision.  
Ivanova et al.’s (2001) constructed the model describing the welfare gain for a 
country from an international financial institution loan based on the interactions between 
the amount of the loan and the policy distortion. Upon signing into a program, the 
incumbent government, then, provides the actual policy changes incorporating the IMF’s 
conditionality as well as loans to affect the utility level of participation in a program. 
However, the optimal country welfare is not always the sole goal of the incumbent 
government. They often subject to corruption and special interest group distortion. In this 
paper, due to limited time and data availability, country fixed effect is introduced to 
account for the unobserved variables that include these policy distortion factors.   
According to Ivanova et al. (2001), international assistance has a diminishing 
marginal return on country’s welfare. The level of appropriate conditionality, in return, 
accelerates the effect from loan. But, in corresponding to the moral hazard hypothesis, 
IMF loans induce bad economic policy with a higher level of policy distortion; 
Boockmann and Dreher (2003) suggest that the money disbursed increases borrowing 
government’s leeway, thus reducing incentives to reform. Dreher and Vaubel (2004) also 
find evidence that more expansive economic policies are found in countries with higher 
IMF loan disbursement. Therefore, we don’t have a clear hypothetical direction of loan 
effect on growth. As introduced in previous sections, one of the main channels of the 
IMF influencing growth is the catalytic effect of bringing private investment and capital 
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inflow (Bird and Mosley, 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that participation effect on 
growth is larger than the disbursement amount effect on growth.  
Other things also affect the objective function of the IMF and the objective 
function of the incumbent government. Due to the concessional condition of the 
structural adjustment programs, the interest rate set by the IMF is minimal; hence, the 
difference between the market rate and the interest rate is considered a cost to the IMF. 
Therefore, we would expect the higher market rate, the less likely the IMF disburses a 
loan. As presented earlier in the Literature Review section, one channel for the IMF to 
influence the welfare of a country also relies on the catalytic effect. The higher the loan 
disbursed often sends a signal of higher trust to the private creditors; hence we would see 
a higher investment to contribute to growth along with the loan program. If a country is 
participating in another IMF short-term program, I would see an accelerating effect of 
loan on growth, since the country is targeting both short-term and longer term 
adjustment, and the government should have low policy distortion to accept 
conditionality from both programs.   
According to previous literature, human capital is hypothesized to be positively 
correlated to growth. As to the initial conditions of an economy, the neo-classical theory 
predicts that poorer countries grow faster to catch up; however, it may also represents a 
worse situation for the program to take effect; therefore, its direction of impact is hard to 
suspect.   
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B. Variable Introduction:  
Most existing literature studying the growth effect of IMF programs has either 
chosen the measurement of result at the program year, immediately after the program 
year, or using the average growth rate of periods. In evaluating the growth effect of the 
longer-term programs, however, it is ideal to put a longer time span (of at least 10 years) 
to see the lagged effect on growth. Nevertheless, due to data availability, I would have to 
sacrifice the evaluation of part or all of PRGFs and all of ECFs to sustain the 10 year time 
span. Therefore, in this research, I focuse on dependent variables of growth rate in the 
program year, growth rate one year after the loan disbursement, growth rate two years 
after the loan disbursement, and growth rate three years after the loan disbursement. In 
this way, I extended the observation to a slightly longer period than what mostly 
literature have done, although still in the rein of “short-run”. Bird and Mosely (2003) 
describe that short-run effect is crucial for the successful completion of a program. If a 
structural adjustment program only focuses on its long-run effect and ignores its short-
term effect, e.g. ignoring short-term growth, it will likely encounter strong social and 
political opposition and eventually fail. Notwithstanding, I will still provide growth effect 
in eight, nine, ten years in the appendix to supplement the result.  
According to the theoretical framework and following Dreher (2006), this paper 
employs independent variables in evaluating the growth effect from six different groups: 
structural adjustment variables, involvement in the IMF, human capital indicators, world 
financial market indicator, initial economic indicator, and previous government policy.  
The structural adjustment variables are divided into two sets: one set considers simply the 
participation in each structural adjustment programs (SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and ECF), 
15
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while the other considers the level of loan disbursement from each program (SAFamount, 
ESAFamount, PRGFamount and ECFamount). Involvement in the IMF includes 
inotherporgram. If a country is in another program (which includes short term traditional 
lending programs like Standbys and EFFs) targeting short-term balance of payment 
adjustment, it usually have to sacrifice its longer term goal, such as growth. Human 
capital indicators include populationgrowth and fertilityrate. Population growth and 
fertility rate provides potential for labor and human capital accumulation towards growth, 
hence are perceived to be positive. Initial economic indicators in the regression include 
Ln_lag_gdppercapta1 and lag_investment1. Initial GDP per capital is hypothesized to 
have a negative relationship with growth; in other words, growth rises with worse initial 
situation. Initial investment is hypothesized to be positively related to growth. Previous 
policy group includes inflation and lag_governmentconsumption1. These two variables 
represent the level of policy distortion prior to the loan disbursement. We would see the 
negative relationship between policy distortion and growth rate. And lastly, libor 
represents the world market.  
Apart from examining the growth effect, this paper also seeks for factors affecting 
program participation and loan disbursement for different programs. According to 
previous literature studying the determinant of program participation, I also include six 
groups of variables: involvement in the IMF, debt and national account, political 
environment and ideology, world financial market indicator, initial economic conditions, 
previous debt and national account. In this setting, the involvement in the IMF includes: 
inotherprogram, Ln_quotasize, and yearsmember. Debt and national account includes 
totaldebtservice, shorttermdebt, and currentaccount (hence the previous situation 
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includes lagged one year term for each one of the three). Political ideology related 
variables include: democracy and civilliberty. World financial market is indicated by 
libor, again. Initial economic conditions inlucde Ln_lag_gdppercapita, and 
lag_investment.  
 
V. Econometrics Methodology  
As previously touched on, there are a variety of methods commonly used to 
evaluate the impact of IMF programs. First, before-after analysis identifies the economic 
growth difference before the program approval and after the program completion. Any 
measurable growth is then attributed to the effect of the program. However, critics argue 
that this would understate the program’s effect since participating in a program often 
happens in the time of crisis. The second approach is often referred to as “with-without” 
approach, which is commonly used to compare the growth rate in program countries with 
that in a control group. However, disadvantage exists in the identification of control 
group. Programs are chosen in countries with specific characters, which may be the 
crucial differences from those non-program countries. The third is regression analysis. 
The regression analysis is considered the most promising approach, but only if the 
endogeneity problem is carefully accounted (Dreher, 2006; Evrensel, 2007).  Evrensel 
(2002) concludes that all approaches are problematic, and a perfect solution to problems 
in the program evaluation does not exist. In this paper, I choose to use a regression 
analysis to measure the growth effect of IMF programs in Sub-Saharan region.  
17
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As previously indicated, the IMF programs are often chosen in times of economic 
crisis. We usually see a country signing into an IMF contract only under severe economic 
issues. Therefore, the participation in the IMF program is not independent from growth 
rate. The endogeneity problem associated with IMF variables needs to be accounted 
carefully. Previous research has frequently applied the instrumental variable method and 
the fixed effect method (Dreher, 2006). As with the measurement of the success of IMF 
programs, no approach to account for the endogeneity is perfect. The difficulty of 
implementing the instrumental approach lies in the finding of variables that only affect 
the probability of programs participation and loan distribution, without affecting growth. 
The deficiency of fixed effect approach can only account for certain types of endogeneity 
issues. Due to data availability and limited time span of research, I could not identify 
enough IV’s to effectively account for endogeneity in the regression. Hence, I use the 
fixed effect method with standard error adjusted for robust clustering by country to 
compensate the lack of instrument. The fixed effect effectively accounts for the 
unobserved factors that relate to growth and program participation (and loan 
disbursement), only if unobserved factors do not vary from year to year. For example, 
besides the IMF, the World Bank has been heavily involved in the long term 
development programs in Sub-Saharan countries. The impact from the World Bank can 
be reflected in the growth rate in a country. It may also relate to the IMF’s evaluation of 
the country’s situation in accepting the program request and the loan disbursement. I plot 
year against all independent variables from growth regressions for each country to 
examine possible variations across time. The result reveals a relative stable trend of the 
observed factors; hence, we infer that the unobserved factors stable over time, and that 
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the fixed effect model is effective. Although effective, the direct causal relationship 
between program participation variables and growth can still not be accounted. A 
systematic set of instruments are still needed for the future research. 
 Hence, the econometric model specifies as: 
growth = f(structural adjustment program participation/disbursement, 
involvement in the IMF, human capital, world financial market indicator, initial 
economic conditions, previous policy distortion, country dummies)          (1) 
Besides the growth regressions, for the regressions considering program 
participation determinants, I use probit regression; and for determinants on loan 
disbursement amount, I choose tobit regression. 
Therefore, we have: 
Program participation/loan disbursement = f(inotherprogram, Ln_quotasize, 
yearsmember. totaldebtservice, shorttermdebt, currentaccount, lag_totaldebtservice1, 
lag_shorttermdebt1, lag_currentaccount1, democracy, civilliberty, libor, 
Ln_lag_gdppercapita1, lag_investment1)             (2) 
 
VI. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 This research targets the impact of IMF mid-term to long-term structural 
adjustment lending programs on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan regions. In this 
paper, mid-term to long-term structural programs from the IMF include SAF, ESAF, 
PRGF, and ECF. Officially, 45 member countries are included in the IMF’s Sub-Saharan 
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regional groups. Due to lack of sufficient data, South Sudan is not included in the 
analysis. Since the first official structural adjustment program, SAF, was formally 
adopted in 1986, I included a time span from 1986 to 2011. In the sample, Senegal 
received the first SAF loan in 1986 for the amount of SDR 0.8 million. There are a total 
of 1127 observations. Each observation represents country i in year t. From now on, we 
refer to each observation as a country year. We refer to country years in a longer term 
structural adjustment program as program country year; otherwise, we refer it to non-
program country year. Among all country years, there are 518 program country years, 
and 171 country years in other IMF lending programs, which include mostly SBA, EFF, 
and a few other temporary lending programs, and the rest are not in any typical IMF 
programs.  
The table below (Table 1) presents descriptive statistics of all variables in the 
research (excluding the lag term variables). From Table 1, we can see that 19% of the 
country years have been under SAF programs, 17% in ESAF, 19% in PRGF, and 3.2% in 
ECF. The average growth rate is about 3.88% for all country years. Once we break down 
the full sample, the average growth rate for a program country year is 4.18% and 3.62% 
for a non-program country year (refer to Table 2, below).  
Table 2 presents two sample t-tests results comparing differences in mean growth 
rates between non-program country years and program country years. We split the 
sample into participating in SAF, ESAF, PRGF, ECF, and non-program country years. 
Comparing the mean growth differences for SAF participation years, none of the groups 
provides support for a statistically significant mean value from non-program country 
years. Same situation lies for the comparison between ESAF participation and non-
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program participation. However, strong and statistically significant different mean 
growth rates are shown between PRGF participation and non-program country years 
across evaluation years. Although the sample size is small for ECF participation (only 36 
observations), country years participating in ECF have a significantly different mean 
growth rate from non-participating country years across measured years except for one 
year after loan disbursement.  
Graph 1 (below) plots the difference of average growth rate between each 
program groups and non-program country years starting from the year t when the loan is 
disbursed to year t+3, three years after the loan disbursement. Overall, the result from 
two sample t-tests is optimistic. However, simply comparing the mean growth rate may 
be misleading, since various other factors may affect the growth rate outside of IMF 
programs. Therefore, we proceed to regression analysis.  
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Graph 1 – Average Growth Rate Difference Compared to Non-
Program Country Years Across Years
SAF ESAF PRGF ECF
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SAF  
 
1127 0.189885 0.392384 0 1 
SAFAmount  1127 5.268438 17.49463 0 182 
ESAF  
 
1127 0.165927 0.372181 0 1 
ESAFamount  1127 13.18483 53.25905 0 662 
PRGF  
 
1127 0.168589 0.374555 0 1 
PRGFamount  1127 3.304348 18.39493 0 447 
ECF  
 
1127 0.031943 0.175927 0 1 
ECFamount  1127 0.837622 7.411364 0 158 
growth  1127 3.878707 7.698245 -51.0309 106.2798 
civilliberty 1127 4.397516 1.43847 1 7 
currentaccountpergdp 1099 -6.22196 10.5327 -124.557 25.627 
democracy  1036 2.971042 3.341603 0 10 
fertilityrate 1114 5.396209 1.256535 1.47 8.007 
inflation  1084 2.77E+09 3.10E+10 0.021 5.16E+11 
inotherprogram 1127 0.15173 0.358919 0 1 
governmentconsumptionpergdp 1012 15.7328 7.892165 2.047121 69.54283 
investment 1060 21.40917 12.12593 1.372 125.168 
libor  
 
1127 4.643067 2.411443 0.507 9.272 
ln_lag_gdppercapita1 1111 104.051 693.7273 4.164434 8755.373 
ln_quotasize  1127 1912618 1.28E+07 14.91412 1.02E+08 
populationgrowth 1127 2.444457 1.182456 -7.53325 9.770495 
shorttermdebtpertotaldebt 1072 9.436212 10.25732 0 71.4592 
totaldebtservicepergdp 901 15.61074 15.4839 0.411216 134.788 
yearsmember 1127 24.69299 9.11588 0 40 
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Table 2 Two-sample t test with unequal variances testing mean growth 
 
 
not in structural 
adjustment program in SAF in ESAF in PRGF in ECF 
growth in the 
current year 
mean 3.623 2.73 3.892 5.402 5.07 
std. 8.546 6.87 7.354 4.457 3.57 
mean difference  0.893 -0.27 -1.779*** -1.447** 
t-stats 
 
1.53 -0.426 -3.7556 -2.102 
growth one 
year after 
mean 3.921 2.861 3.808 5.334 4.171 
std. 8.499 8.394 7.589 4.351 4.032 
mean difference  1.06 0.113 -1.413*** -0.250 
t-stats 
 
1.583 0.172 -3.025 -0.331 
growth two 
years after 
mean 3.947 2.913 4.321 5.277 6.007 
std. 8.239 8.764 7.982 4.187 4.139 
mean difference  1.034 -0.374 -1.33*** -2.06*** 
t-stats 
 
1.508 -0.556 -2.946 -2.689 
growth three 
years after 
mean 3.799 3.33 4.373 5.601 6.264 
std. 8.199 9.136 8.051 4.04 1.863 
mean difference  0.469 -0.574 -1.902*** -2.464*** 
t-stats 
 
0.663 -0.849 -4.067 -5.42 
 
n 609 214 187 190 36 
 
 
 
VII. Main Regression Results 
 To further examine the theories and arguments as developed in previous sections, 
and to examine the hypothesis of growth impact from participating in a longer-term 
structural adjustment program, this section provides regression analysis to assist 
explanation.  
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A. Determinants of Program Participation and Loan Disbursement 
Before examining the growth effect of each program, I start with regressions 
looking for what determines a country’s program participation and what determines the 
level of loan disbursement. As presented in the theoretical framework and hypothesis 
section, the effect of IMF loan programs on country’s welfare depends on the incumbent 
government’s decision, which further results from the bargaining process between the 
IMF and the incumbent government. The bargaining process determines whether the 
government accepts conditions imposed by the IMF along with the loan. Therefore, apart 
from its direct result, the factors determining program participation also serves an 
important role in screening for selection variables. After the loan approval, the level of 
loan distribution also relies upon multifarious factors, ranging from the global market, 
compliance with the conditionality of the borrowing country, and the bargaining power 
between the IMF and the incumbent government.  
Table 3 (below) presents regression results for determinants of IMF longer-term 
structural adjustment program participation and level of loan disbursement. For each 
program, I used the tobit regression with error term clustered by country and robust 
adjusted to examine determinants for loan disbursement amount, and the probit 
regression to examine the program participation.  
  The negative coefficient for inotherprogram for ESAF and PRGF participations 
and loan disbursements are statistically significant. It suggests that if a country is in other 
IMF programs during the year, it is likely that it is not going to participate in the longer-
term structural adjustment program. The variable inotherprograms includes short-term 
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facilities, primarily SBAs and EFFs, dealing with short term balance of payment crisis. 
When countries running into short-term balance of payment problems, they are likely to 
adjust immediate severe short-term problems first before adjusting longer term structural 
problems, therefore, they are not likely to enter a structural adjustment program. Having 
already been in a short-term program, the country has subjected to much conditionality. It 
is less likely for a country to accept more conditionality and lose its authority and policy 
freedom. Years of membership has a positive relationship on PRGF and ECF 
participation, but a negative relationship on SAF and ESAF participation. We would 
expect that the longer a country is in the IMF, the more likely it is to accept help from the 
IMF, and the more evidence the IMF has to justify the loan disbursement. However, it 
may also be true that the longer a country is in the IMF membership, the more requests it 
is likely to bring up, hence it is less likely for it to receive the approval. The quota remain 
might also be limited due to overdraft. Democracy and civil liberty index are found 
statistically significant across regressions. Previous literature provides evidence that a 
more liberal and democratic country tends to resemble the IMF’s dominant political 
ideology, hence is more prone to the IMF programs, and hence the IMF programs are 
more keen to offer help. However, the more democratic government may be less prone to 
ask the IMF for help. LIBOR rate is an index for global financial market. The higher it 
reaches, the more expensive it is for the IMF to disburse its loans. Interestingly, it is only 
found positively correlated to SAF and ESAF program participation. The negative 
coefficients of the lagged one year GDP per capita on the all program participation probit 
and loan disbursement tobit regressions show that countries with worse initial economic 
situation tend to participate in a program. And the worse the initial situation, the more 
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money the IMF is likely to disburse through the loan. All else being equal, a more 
developed economy has more domestic resources; hence it is less likely for them to 
borrow from the IMF. This shows, again, the endogeneity issue between program 
participation and economic condition. The current year account balance situations tend to 
have a negative relationship to SAF program participation and positive relationship to 
ECF disbursement. We may expect that the higher debt service, the more likely a country 
is running into balance of payment and associated issues; and is therefore in need of 
structural adjustment assistance from the IMF. However, countries tend to regard the IMF 
as the last lending resort. The increase of current year debt may imply a country’s ability 
to garner resource from other parties. It is possible that countries having other borrowing 
channels would be less likely to participate in the IMF program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27
Yang: Evaluate the Effect of IMF’s Longer-Term Concessional Lending Programs on Growth
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2013
Table 3 –Determinants of IMF longer term structural adjustment programs and loans  
 SAF ESAF PRGF ECF 
 Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit 
Inotherprogram -3.065 0.039 -67.989 -0.541 -34.316 -1.267 
  
(5.760) (0.159) (31.676)** (0.177)*** (15.047)** (0.345)*** 
  
ln_quotasize 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00)*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Yearsmember -1.688 -0.056 -1.613 -0.015 2.020 0.077 3.089 0.134 
(0.415)*** (0.009)*** (1.322) (0.009)* (0.635)*** (0.011)*** (2.072) (0.076)* 
totaldebtservice
pergdp 
-0.580 0.002 -0.816 0.005 -0.286 -0.016 1.911 -0.029 
(0.657) (0.006) (1.693) (0.005) (0.268) (0.008)** (1.141)* (0.141) 
shorttermdebtp
ertotaldebt 
0.150 -0.035 0.632 -0.018 -0.255 -0.017 2.390 -0.062 
(0.096) (0.022)* (0.552) (0.019) (0.256) (0.014) (5.802) (0.052) 
currentaccountp
ergdp 
-0.366 -0.020 -1.800 -0.015 0.471 0.020 3.391 0.095 
(0.282) (0.012)* (1.215) (0.012) (0.315) (0.013) (2.075)* (0.070) 
democracy -2.795 -0.069 -5.660 -0.013 1.458 0.045 9.344 0.067 
(0.152)* (0.027)*** (6.383) (0.026) (0.949) (0.027)* (6.077) (0.12) 
civilliberty -5.593 -0.172 -27.602 -0.197 -3.722 -0.182 -7.263 -0.711 
(2.734)** (0.066)*** (15.995)* (0.065)*** (3.785) (0.074)** (16.697) (0.451) 
libor 1.044 0.072 10.279 0.101 -1.158 -0.027 -553.740 -9.979 
(1.056) (0.035)** (2.841)*** (0.035)*** (0.878) (0.035) (1060.23) (9.054) 
ln_lag_gdpperca
pita1 
-15.447 -0.423 -41.127 -0.341 -11.683 -0.506 -33.473 -1.037 
(6.860)** (0.113)*** (23.614)* (0.112)*** (4.642)** (0.103)*** (11.436)*** (0.546)** 
lag_investment1 -0.252 -0.014 -2.123 -0.017 -0.128 -0.004 -2.302 -0.097 
(0.368) (0.006)** (1.563) (0.006)*** (0.272) (0.008) (1.560) (0.056)* 
lag_totaldebtser
vicepergdp1 
-0.098 0.007 -0.622 0.011 -0.282 0.003 -0.839 0.079 
(0.546) (0.006) (1.562) (0.005)** (0.337) (0.007) (1.084) (0.098) 
lag_shorttermde
btpertotaldebt1 
0.288 -0.001 1.876 -0.008 0.166 -0.013 0.410 0.025 
(0.199) (0.021) (0.965)** (0.019) (0.179) (0.015) (2.233) (0.048) 
lag_currentacco
untpergdp1 
-0.086 -0.007 -2.006 -0.018 -0.859 -0.026 -0.780 -0.008 
(0.374) (0.012) (1.504) (0.013) (0.462)* (0.014)* (1.937) (0.075) 
_cons 131.954 3.835 237.685 2.023 12.073 1.332 412.134 12.095 
(43.194)*** (0.958)*** (163.723) (0.915)** (43.704) (0.895) (580.358) (7.988) 
sigma 35.041 
 
142.708 
 
29.132 
 
42.185 
 
Prob > F 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Predictive ability 
 
76.34% 
 
80.03% 
 
82.95% 
 
98.85% 
N 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 
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B. Growth Effect 
 After examining the IMF longer-term structural adjustment program participation 
and loan disbursement, we can proceed to the regression of the effect of these structural 
adjustment programs on growth. This paper borrows the growth regression variable 
specification from Dreher (2006); however, I not only look at immediate growth effect 
from the IMF longer term structural adjustment programs for the year loans are 
disbursed, i.e. used, but also the growth effect one year after, two years after, and three 
years after. Therefore, I employ four sets of regressions. Each set of regressions include 
two specifications. Specification 1 only takes into account whether a country year is in 
any of the structural adjustment programs. Specification 2 only looks at the amount of 
each structural adjustment programs.   
 Table 4 (below) presents the fixed effect regression results for the impact of 
longer-term structural adjustment program on growth across years. According to results 
from Specification 1, for SAF, the first longer-term structural adjustment program, it has 
a consistent negative effect on growth starting from its immediate disbursement; 
however, the negative effect is only statistically significant at two years after loan 
disbursement. Participating in a SAF is expected to decrease growth by 1.381 percentage 
points two years after the loan disbursement, holding other things constant. For the 
second structural adjustment program, ESAF, unfortunately, it does not present any 
statistically significant relationship to growth across years, although the effects are seen 
positive. These results correspond to the critics from previous research, such as The 
Meltzer Commission on the effectiveness of IMF structural adjustment programs.  
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Starting 1999, the IMF initiated a series of program adjustment and began to 
“streamline” its conditionality, which then produced the PRGF. Indeed, according to the 
regression results, participating in PRGF has shown a steadier and statistically significant 
growth effect across years. Involving in a PRGF is expected to improve growth of the 
immediate year by 1.835 percentage points, ceteris paribus; is expected to improve 
growth the next year by 1.127 percentage points, ceteris paribus; 0.892 percentage points 
two years after, ceteris paribus; and 1.312 percentage points on growth three years after, 
ceteris paribus. In 2009, the IMF further streamlined its conditionality, aiming at having 
the participating country owning structural adjustment. Accordingly, it initiated the ECF 
to replace the PRGF. From the regression analysis, ECF, compared to PRGF, has a larger 
effect on growth across years; however, the effect on growth second year after does not 
shown significant. Participating in ECF is predicted to improve growth by 2.864 
percentage points immediately, ceteris paribus; by 2.759 percentage points two years 
after the loan disbursement, ceteris paribus; and to improve growth by 2.471 percentage 
points three years after initial disbursement, ceteris paribus.  
Proceeding to examine the effect of loan disbursement amount on growth, we 
look at Specification 2. Similar to results from Specification 1, SAF has shown a 
statistically significant negative effect on growth. Holding everything else constant, from 
the year the loan is disbursed to two years after disbursement, each one million SDR 
disbursement from SAF account to a country is likely to retard growth by -0.03 
percentage points, -0.033 percentage points, and -0.045 percentage points (the effect on 
the third year after disbursement is not statistically significant, hence not mentioning 
here). ESAF, again, does not present significant effect on growth. Although its effect on 
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year t0 is statistically significant, each million SDR of disbursement only improves 
growth by 0.006 percentage points. PRGF disbursement amount is seen statistically 
significantly correlated to growth only for the first two years. Each one million SDR 
disbursement from PRGF to a country improves through by 0.02 percentage points for 
the current year, and by 0.01 percentage points the next year, ceteris paribus. 
Interestingly, ECF has only had an implementation of three years in the data set; its 
disbursement has shown strong statistically significant improvement on growth across 
years. All else equal, each one million SDR disbursement from ECF account is projected 
to improve growth by 0.053 percentage points in the immediate year, 0.038 percentage 
points the year after. For the two and three years after initial disbursement, it is expected 
to improve growth by 0.038 percentage points and 0.030 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus. Comparing the statistically significant coefficients between Specification 1 and 
2 for each year for each program, we see that participation dummy variables often have a 
dramatically larger coefficient than disbursement amount variables. Reason behind may 
lead to the catalytic effect of joining an IMF structural adjustment program. Specification 
2, loan disbursement amount for each program only measures the effect from each 
million SDR disbursement on growth. However, dummy for participation in Specification 
1 generically depicts the total participation effect, which may includes the effect from 
structural adjustment besides returns from loans, as well as the indicator effect for other 
private capital inflows that are not captured by the disbursement amount.  
Bird and Mosley (2003) provides hypothesis that growth effect from compressing 
demand might provide J-curve result. In another words, short-term drawback and longer 
term growth. In the event that shorter term growth effect from SAF and ESAF don’t show 
31
Yang: Evaluate the Effect of IMF’s Longer-Term Concessional Lending Programs on Growth
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2013
optimistic results, hence, I proceed to examine their longer-term growth effect. Applying 
the same fixed effect regression model, I use the growth rate eight, nine, ten years from 
initial disbursement. The detail table is presented in the Appendix, Table 5. The result 
turns out to be not material. None of the program variables (dummy for participation and 
disbursement amount) show a statistically significant impact on growth not only for SAF 
and ESAF, but also across programs, despite the IMF’s effort of modifying it through 
years.  
 Apart from the impact of structural adjustment programs on growth, some other 
variables also provide interesting and important feedbacks on growth from the fixed 
effect models. Populationgrowth shows a strong and statistically significant positive 
effect on growth across years (except three years afterwards). This variable implies a 
direct human capital accumulation, which contributes to growth; however, its effect 
losses significance in later years. Reasons associated with this effect are ambiguous. 
Seeing the population growth rate is the net of birth rate and death rate. We may see a 
longer life expectancy which leads to smaller death rate as the economy improves, which 
may also prolong working age, thus contributing to growth in the near years. However, 
the associated increase in birth rate associated may divert the labor productivity and 
dilute its effect in later years. Fertility rate is seen to have a strong and significant 
negative impact on growth in the first two years, but disappears in the later two years. We 
may infer that better health conditions, which may relate to higher income and growth, 
lead to higher fertility rate. However, newborn babies require care, so more people may 
remain at home to care for the children and are not participating in production activities. 
The initial GDP per capita is found to be negatively related to growth (only not for the 
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year after the current year), and the magnitude of impact increases as well. According 
neoclassical economic growth theories, we may suspect a faster growth rate if a country 
comes from an inferior situation. And lastly, LIBOR rate has a positive relationship with 
growth rate in the current year, and a negative relationship with growth two years later, 
and three years later.  
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Table 4 –Effect of IMF longer-term structural lending programs on growth in 0, 1, 2, 3 years 
 
growth t growth t+1 growth t+2 growth t+3 
Robust Clustered Robust Clustered Robust Clustered Robust Clustered 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
SAF -0.897  
-0.551 
 
-1.381 
 
-0.406 
 
(0.904) 
 
(0.730) 
 
(0.523)** 
 
(0.659) 
 
ESAF 0.702  
0.144 
 
1.016 
 
0.905 
 
(0.728) 
 
(0.732) 
 
(0.814) 
 
(0.734) 
 
PRGF 1.835  
1.127 
 
0.892 
 
1.312 
 
(0.444)***  (0.545)** 
 
(0.473)* 
 
(0.575)** 
 
ECF 2.864  
1.507 
 
2.759 
 
2.471 
 
(0.932)***  (1.024) 
 
(0.881)***  (0.721)***  
SAFAmount  -0.030  
-0.033 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.022 
 
(0.014)** 
 
(0.013)** 
 
(0.011)***  (0.015) 
ESAFamount  0.006  
0.002 
 
0.004 
 
-0.001 
 
(0.003)* 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
PRGFamount  0.018  
0.010 
 
0.007 
 
0.007 
 
(0.006)***  (0.004)** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
ECFamount  0.053  
0.038 
 
0.038 
 
0.030 
 
(0.011)***  (0.010)***  (0.012)***  (0.009)*** 
inotherprogram 0.678 0.280 -0.119 -0.367 0.040 -0.397 -0.160 -0.635 
(0.498) (0.479) (0.418) (0.373) (0.463) (0.444) (0.566) (0.572) 
populationgrowth 1.236 1.355 1.092 1.162 0.618 0.717 0.353 0.425 
(0.262)*** (0.270)*** (0.235)*** (0.250)*** (0.229)*** (0.243)*** (0.252) (0.274) 
fertilityrate -1.212 -1.497 -0.986 -1.093 -0.170 -0.253 0.108 0.024 
(0.608)** (0.567)*** (0.6)* (0.564)* (0.520) (0.491) (0.468) (0.462) 
ln_lag_gdppercapita1 -0.943 -0.958 -0.855 -0.887 -1.826 -1.833 -1.909 -1.968 
(0.535)* (0.558)* (0.953) (0.978) (0.931)** (0.955)* (1.109)* (1.167)* 
lag_investment1 0.173 0.175 0.109 0.109 0.128 0.128 0.035 0.036 
(0.111) (0.113) (0.050)** (0.052)** (0.086) (0.089) (0.044) (0.045) 
lag_governmentconsu
mptionpergdp1 
-0.166 -0.164 -0.066 -0.067 0.019 0.015 0.032 0.033 
(0.085)* (0.090)* (0.073) (0.073) (0.042) (0.045) (0.059) (0..060) 
inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)* (0.00)* 
libor 0.186 0.143 0.006 -0.015 -0.320 -0.361 -0.536 -0.566 
(0.102)* (0.105) (0.089) (0.091) (0.097)*** (0.098)*** (0.122)*** (0.119)*** 
_cons 11.095 12.936 10.583 11.562 13.358 14.183 15.589 16.876 
(5.759)* (5.661)** (8.343) (8.356) (7.500)* (7.508)* (8.595)* (8.939)* 
sigma_u 2.353 2.222 1.955 1.934 2.587 2.476 3.198 3.087 
sigma_e 5.631 5.642 5.576 5.566 5.621 5.615 5.594 5.601 
Rho 0.149 0.134 0.109 0.108 0.175 0.163 0.246 0.233 
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VIII. Discussion 
The graph below (Graph 2) plots the coefficients of participating in each loan 
programs from the fixed effect model across years. It provides a direct illustration of 
program effects. In summary, the regression analysis shows that longer term adjustment 
programs generally do have a statistically significant impact on growth rate in the Sub-
Saharan region immediately or in the short term, especially for the recent programs after 
“streamlining”.   
The IMF’s involvement in the structural adjustment often emphasizes on 
improving the economic infrastructure, which, therefore, puts aggregate demand 
management at the center under the binding constraint of external financing. Facing the 
lackluster effect on growth from the programs, Bird and Mosely (2003) comments that 
such is the high cost from policy of compressing aggregate demand. They summarize the 
various discussions on the IMF policies by saying that to compress aggregate demand, 
the demand for demand for imports must be reduced and the current account balance of 
payments must be strengthened.  Uncomfortable results of these approaches include 
oppressing investment in private sectors and government expenditure. The current 
account improvement now is often at the cost of its future deterioration. These results all 
tend to have adverse effect on growth, and are not favorable to the incumbent 
government (Bird and Mosely, 2003). Such is the case in the earlier time structural 
adjustment, especially SAF. In the context of LICs, financial markets and tax system are 
often incomplete. This leads to bigger obstacles that monetary and fiscal policies and 
exchange rate adjustment policies are facing. Therefore, in order to alleviate political 
resilience, since PRGF, the IMF has tried to streamline its associated conditionality and 
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allow the country to take the ownership of a program. Hence, from the regression result, 
we see a significant improvement on growth impact from ESAF to PRGF. In ECF, the 
IMF has further strengthened the protection to social safety net, health and education 
expenditure, and tax regime reformation into its longer term structural adjustment 
package. This further diminishes the adjustment fictions, and supplements other core 
adjustment policies to ensure a more successful achievement.  
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Graph 2 – Effect of Longer-Term Structural Adjustment 
Programs on Growth Rate Across Years
SAF ESAF PRGF ECF
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VIIII. Conclusion 
Although numerous studies have targeted the IMF’s program effectiveness, 
limited research has been done to identify the effectiveness of specific types of program. 
Among the studies that categorize the impact from different types, most have been 
focused on IMF’s short-term lending programs on balance-of-payment. Although 
systematic empirical studies on IMF longer-term structural adjustment programs to low 
income countries have been missing, various criticisms have been questioning the 
validity of their existence. Therefore, it is time to gather more available data resources to 
evaluate the effectiveness of IMF’s longer-term structural adjustment programs and to 
provide evidence on whether the amendment of these programs has been positive. 
Previously, because of the limit of data, for the limited study on structural 
adjustment programs, most researchers only evaluate whether a country was in a 
program. This study look the full time span of 25 years from 1986 to 2011 and selected 
44 countries in the Sub-Saharan region to evaluate not only the participation effect, but 
also the level of loan disbursement of SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and ECF on growth. Due to 
data availability, I only measure the growth rate immediately after disbursement, one year 
after the disbursement, two years afterwards, and three years afterwards. Although not a 
perfect measurement, often times, the success of longer-term structural adjustment 
depends on short-term effect. Positive short-term effect provides leeway for further 
adjustment.  
Prior to evaluating the growth effect, this paper also seeks to find variables 
determining the loan program participation and the loan amount disbursement. A set of 
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tobit regressions provide evidence on program loan disbursement and a set of probit 
regressions provide insight on program participation.  
Two sample t-tests comparing the mean value of growth rate between program 
country years and non program country years corresponds to the regression analysis in 
terms of the general trend of the program impact on growth from the current year to three 
years later. However, the level of significance varies from methods to methods. Lastly, 
fixed effect models account for endogeneity issues providing a more convincing result on 
the impact of program participation and loan disbursement on growth.   
In summary, through the history of the evolution of structural adjustment 
programs, the first longer term program, namely SAF created in 1986, had a negative 
growth impact on participating countries. Luckily, it was abandoned in the early 1990s. 
Instead, ESAF, the second longer term structural adjustment concessional financing 
program, which was enlarged in 1996, showed statistically insignificant positive effect on 
growth. In 1999, ESAF was “streamlined” and reformed to PRGF. Aiming at being more 
efficient and effective, after trimming much of attached conditionality, PRGF does have 
evidence of creating stronger growth effect than its predecessor, ESAF. In 2009, ECF 
replaced PRGF to provide medium term lending to low income countries with a stronger 
focus on priority spending and social safety net protection. Under the newly created 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, ECF demonstrates a better improvement from 
PRGF. Although still in the limited years of implementation, ECF has shown much 
stronger positive effect on growth than any of the previous longer term structural 
adjustment programs. However, as years go by, more data will be produced to support or 
reject this conclusion.  
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Due to limited time and data, there are deficiencies within this research. The loan 
disbursement variable is directly selected from the IMF Annual Report. In the reporting, 
timing was not precisely accounted. It does not specify when the loan is disbursed in 
different time of a fiscal year. This may provide bias in estimating the short term growth 
effect. For example, the effect of growth in the next year from receiving a loan in January 
the year before, must be essentially different from a loan disbursed in December the year 
before. As stated in previous sections, it is ideal to evaluate the effect of IMF structural 
adjustment programs in a long time span. However, due to data availability, long term 
effect could not be fully evaluated. In Appendix, I did regression on growth effect 8, 9 10 
years later after the initial disbursement, however, the newer programs, PRGF and ECF, 
could not be fully accounted. It has been remarked that the World Bank has a significant 
effect on growth and poverty reduction in the Sub-Saharan region. The growth of the 
country maybe reflected from the IMF programs, as well as the World Bank programs. It 
would be ideal to find accountable variables to control for the World Bank’s impact. 
However, due to data limitation, I can only attribute it to the fixed effect, under the 
assumption of it being consistent over the years. Lastly, as I indicated in the methodology 
section, this paper chooses fixed effect regression to account for endogeneity. It is 
effective only when the unobserved factors stay consistent and affect both growth and 
participation. But there is a directly mutual relationship between growth and 
participation, which is relied upon a set of accurate instrument variable methods. 
Therefore, future research should improve upon these deficiencies and provide a more 
reliable and viable examination on the growth effect from the IMF longer-term structural 
adjustment programs.  
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Appendix – Data Source and Definition 
Variable Data Source Definition 
   
PRGF IMF Annual 
Report 
Dummy that equals one if PRGF is in effect 
for at least 5 months in the year 
PRGFamount IMF Annual 
Report 
The amount of loan disbursed from PRGF 
account to the country in the year 
SAF IMF Annual 
Report 
Dummy that equals one if SAF is in effect 
for at least 5 months in the year 
SAFAmount IMF Annual 
Report 
The amount of loan disbursed from PRGF 
account to the country in the year 
ECF IMF Annual 
Report 
Dummy that equals one if ECF is in effect 
for at least 5 months in the year 
ECFamount IMF Annual 
Report 
The amount of loan disbursed from ECF 
account to the country in the year 
ESAF IMF Annual 
Report 
Dummy that equals one if ESAF is in effect 
for at least 5 months in the year 
ESAFamount IMF Annual 
Report 
The amount of loan disbursed from ESAF 
account to the country in the year 
growth World Bank Annual percentage growth rate of GDP based 
on constant lobal currency 
civilliberty Freedom House Rates civil liberties with 1 representing 
the most free and 7 the least free 
currentaccountpergdp World Bank Current account balance is the sum of net 
exports of goods and services, net primary 
income, and net secondary income, as a 
percentage of GDP 
democracy Political IV, 
Marshall and 
Jaggers (2011) 
0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy 
score. Measures the general openness of 
political institutions. 
fertilityrate World Bank Represents the number of children that 
would be born to a woman if she were to 
live to the end of her childbearing years 
and bear children in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates 
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inflation World Bank Consumer price index in percent 
inotherprogram IMF Annual 
Report 
Dummy that equals one if SBA, EFF and/or 
temporary program is in effect for at least 5 
months in the year 
lag_governmentconsumptionpergdp1 World Bank All government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP 
lag_investment1 World Bank Gross domestic investment as a percentage 
of GDP 
libor IMF London Inter-Bank Offer Rate on 6- 
months deposits in the US dollar. 
ln_lag_gdppercapita1 World Bank GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. 
ln_quotasize IMF The country's quota size in the IMF in the 
year 
populationgrowth World Bank Annual population growth rate year by year 
shorttermdebtpertotaldebt World Bank Short-term debt includes all debt having 
an original maturity of one year or less 
and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
totaldebtservicepergdp World Bank Total debt service is the sum of principal 
repayments and interest actually 
yearsmember IMF Years of membership in the IMF 
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Appendix - Table 5 –Effect of IMF longer-term structural lending programs on 
growth in 8, 9, 10 years 
 
growth t+8 growth t+9 growth t+10 
 
Robust Clustered Robust Clustered Robust Clustered 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
SAF 
0.239 
 
-0.310 
 
-0.217 
 
(0.822) 
 
(0.656) 
 
(0.551) 
 
ESAF 
1.026 
 
-0.252 
 
-0.137 
 
(0.723) 
 
(0.522) 
 
(0.559) 
 
PRGF 
0.802 
 
-0.289 
 
0.410 
 
(0.758) 
 
(0.509) 
 
(0.519) 
 
SAFAmount 
 0.002 
 
0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
ESAFamount 
 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.003 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
PRGFamount 
 0.008 
 
0.026 
 
0.032 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.020) 
inotherprogram 
-0.39916 -0.684 -0.282 -0.161 0.578 0.700 
(0.783) (0.825) (0.880) (0.900) (1.093) (1.159) 
populationgrow
th 
-0.206 -0.204 -0.047 -0.050 -0.157 -0.153 
(0.204) (0.200) (0.263) (0.273) (0.257) (0.259) 
fertilityrate 
-0.863 -0.940 0.922 0.965 0.047 0.069 
(0.906) (0.847) (0.937) (0.912) (0.739) (0.740) 
ln_lag_gdpperc
apita1 
-1.249 -1.266 -1.216 -1.179 -1.108 -1.095 
(1.101) (1.140) (1.237) (1.194) (0.739) (0.717) 
lag_investment
1 
-0.097 -0.091 -0.155 -0.159 -0.148 -0.150 
(0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.081)* (0.080)** (0.049)*** (0.048)*** 
lag_government
consumptionpe
rgdp1 
0.200 0.204 0.119 0.117 0.239 0.239 
(0.138) (0.145) (0.048)** (0.046)** (0.125)* (0.123)* 
inflation 
-1.06E-12 -6.07E-13 -4.88E-11 -4.71E-11 -1.46E-10 -1.45E-10 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
libor 
0.193 0.193 -0.116 -0.0813 -0.028 -0.009 
(0.188) (0.182) (0.202) (0.205) (0.194) (0.187) 
_cons 
14.911 15.691 9.178 8.338 10.940 10.455 
(&.751)* (7.700)** (10.268) (9.743) (6.371)* (6.140)* 
sigma_u 4.451 4.501 5.064 5.129 4.818 4.825 
sigma_e 5.585 5.596 5.035 5.033 4.906 4.904 
rho 0.388 0.393 0.503 0.509 0.491 0.492 
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